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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ROB YN LYNN MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20031009-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions on three counts of forgery, each a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2002), one count of unlawful use of a 
financial transaction card, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-506.2 (2002), and one count of theft of property, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2002), in the Fifth Judicial District, Iron 
County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is defendant entitled to review of his claim that the trial court erred in its 
"purpose to defraud" jury instruction, where defendant approved the jury instructions 
before they were given to the jury? 
No standard of review applies. 
2. Is defendant entitled to review of his claim that the trial court erred when it 
failed to give a "claim of right" jury instruction, where defendant did not preserve the 
claim below, argues neither plain error nor manifest injustice on appeal, and, in any case, 
approved the jury instructions before they were given to the jury? 
No standard of review applies. 
3. Did trial counsel's "fail[ure] to propose a more detailed instruction qualifying 
forgery and theft" and his "fail[ure] to take exception to the instructions given by the 
court" constitute ineffective assistance? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim made for first time on appeal presents a 
question of law reviewable for correctness. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, *ft 6, 89 P.3d 
162. 
4. Is defendant entitled to review of his claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the conviction, where defendant did not preserve that claim below and where he 
has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal? 
No standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes and rule are reproduced in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2 (2002); and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with three counts of forgery, each a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2002), one count of unlawful 
use of a financial transaction card, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-506.2 (2002), and one count of theft of property, a third degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2002). R2-4. The prosecution subsequently reduced the 
charge of theft of property to a class A misdemeanor. R65. 
A jury found defendant guilty on all counts. R86, 116-18. Defendant was 
sentenced to concurrent indeterminate prison terms not to exceed five years on each 
felony conviction. R146. She was sentenced to a one-year jail term on the misdemeanor 
conviction. R145. The court also imposed fines in connection with some of the 
convictions. R145-46. The court then stayed the execution of the terms of imprisonment 
and the fines, pending defendant's compliance with the requirements of her probation. 
R145. As part of her probation, defendant was ordered to serve six months in jail with an 
opportunity for work release. R144. 
Defendant timely appealed. R149. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Offense 
Defendant and Andrew Miller, her former husband and the victim, were married in 
1986. TT50, 178.l They had two daughters, Sydney and Tristyn, prior to their divorce in 
No record number appears on the trial transcript. 
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1992. TT50, 178, 182. Andrew was incarcerated July 19, 2001, and remained 
incarcerated until May 13 or 14, 2002.2 TT52-53. 
On August 20, 2001, during Andrew's incarceration, a Utah district court entered 
an "Amended Order Modifying Decree of Divorce." Defendant's Exhibit 13. The decree 
ordered that Andrew pay defendant child support of approximately $600 per month, 
effective November 1, 1998. Id. at 1. The decree also ordered that "[s]hould [Andrew] 
be unemployed or incarcerated, all funds which [he] receives from the [Veterans 
Administration (VA)] should be sent directly to [defendant] for child support." Id. at 2. 
Andrew, who received both retirement funds and VA benefits, paid no child support 
during the period of his incarceration. TT73-74. 
In November 2001, defendant filed a card with the post office and with State Bank 
of Southern Utah changing Andrew's address to a post office box address. State's 
Exhibit 1; TT88, 181. Defendant was the renter of that post office box. TT86. Andrew 
did not authorize the change or sign the change of address card. TT55. After the bank 
received its copy of the change of address card, it sent all correspondence regarding 
Andrew's accounts to the post office box. TT88. 
On February 10, 2002, defendant filed an application for a debit card drawing on 
Andrew's checking account with State Bank. TT188; State's Exhibit 3. Defendant 
Andrew remarried sometime after his divorce from defendant, but he and his 
spouse were separated before or during his incarceration. TT181. 
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signed Andrew's name to the application. Id Andrew, who was incarcerated, did not 
authorize these acts. TT 58-59. 
The first of approximately thirteen unauthorized withdrawals occurred on March 
11, 2002. TT95. Andrew became aware of funds missing from his account sometime in 
June or July 2002. TT62. He contacted the bank about the problem, and the bank put a 
hold on his account and programmed the ATM to retain the debit card the next time it 
was used. TT62, 91. The bank also reimbursed Andrew for funds taken from his account 
during the sixty-day period prior to his notification. TT63. The reimbursement was for 
$140. Id. Sometime prior to August 4, 2002, the bank apparently blocked an attempted 
transaction and retained the debit card that was being used to access the account. See 
TT93. 
On August 4, 2002, defendant filed another application for a debit card drawing on 
the account. State's Exhibit 4. Defendant again signed Andrew^ name to the 
application. TT188. Andrew, who was in Ogden in an in-patient substance abuse 
program, did not authorize these acts. TT59-60. The bank, failing to "catch" the history 
of access to the account, issued a second card with a new number, which was mailed to 
the post office box on August 19, 2002. TT94, 104. On August 30, 2002, the ATM 
camera photographed defendant at the ATM at the same time Andrew's account was 
being accessed. State's Exhibits 6, 7; TT114. 
Andrew approached the bank about continuing unauthorized withdrawals from his 
account. TT94, 102. He reviewed the ATM withdrawal records with the bank and 
identified a number of transactions that he had not conducted or authorized. See State's 
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Exhibits 8-12. The bank reimbursed him another $719.06. TT95. The bank again placed 
a block on the account and programmed the ATM to retain any card used to access the 
account. TT94-95. The ATM retained the second card sometime during the first week of 
November 2002. TT102, 104. 
On November 8, 2002, defendant filed another application for a debit card 
drawing on the account. State's Exhibit 5; TT105. Defendant again signed Andrew's 
name to the application. TT188. Andrew, who was then residing with his parents in 
Cedar City, did not authorize these acts. TT61-62. This time, the bank contacted 
Andrew about the new application. TT103. 
Defendant's Version 
Defendant conceded that she signed and filed the change of address card. TT181. 
She testified that Andrew had separated from his second wife shortly before he went to 
jail. Id. She said that "he didn't want his then ex-wife having anything to do with his 
mail and wanted [defendant] to pick it up." Id. She said that Andrew gave her 
authorization to enter the change of address "via letter-writing." TT187. 
Defendant also stated that she visited Andrew while he was incarcerated, 
sometime "in the spring or early January-February" of 2002. TT182. She indicated that 
she went to the jail with her two daughters "to talk to [Andrew] about hi[s] complying 
with the divorce decree stating that [she was] supposed to get the [VA] money." Id. 
Defendant testified that Andrew told her and her daughters that they "could go 
and get the applications and do what we needed to get [the money], but when he got out, 
he would notify us and then he'd start making child support payments on his own." 
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TTl 83. She said that he told his daughter Sydney to "keep the card and decide where the 
money went." TTl 83-84. 
Defendant said that Sydney kept the card, provided defendant with the PIN 
number, and decided how to use the money. Id. Defendant said that Sydney was in the 
passenger seat of the vehicle she was driving when the ATM camera photographed her on 
one of the occasions when funds were withdrawn from Andrew's account. TTl 84. 
Defendant claimed that all of the withdrawals from Andrew's account were authorized. 
TTl86. She indicated that Sydney kept the card, but would occasionally hand it to her 
"for a few minutes . . . from the other side of the car." TTl 90. She did not know how 
many times that had happened. TT191. She also said that Sydney sometimes used the 
card by herself. Id. 
Defendant stated that she applied for the first debit card after Andrew gave Sydney 
authorization at the jail. TTl 88. She stated that she applied for the second card because 
Sydney had lost the first card. Id. She said that she had no knowledge that the bank had 
placed a block on the account prior to her filing the second application. TTl 89. She said 
that she filed the November application, but could not remember why. Id. She was "not 
sure if the card got taken at the thing when Sydney went there or what happened." Id. 
She indicated that the money taken from the account was used for child support. Id. 
Defendant's daughters also testified to the jail visit. TT150-54, 171-73. Sydney, 
who was sixteen when trial was held, testified that defendant authorized her access to his 
account. TT153-57. Sydney stated that she had possession of the card for the whole 
period of time and that her mother never had possession of the card for more than a few 
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minutes. TT161. When asked how many times she had used the card, Sydney said, 
"maybe two, three times." TT158. 
Tristyn, who was fifteen at the time of trial, said that she visited the jail with her 
mother and sister. TT171-72. She said that she could not remember the conversation, 
but overheard her sister talking to their father on the telephone through the glass about 
money. TT172. 
Rebuttal of Defendant's Version 
After defendant rested at trial, the State called two witnesses to address the 
testimony given by defendant and her daughters. Andrew Miller testified that neither his 
wife nor his daughters visited him at any time during his incarceration. TT196. 
Brad Spencer, a sergeant at the Iron County jail, testified that all jail visitors must 
check in prior to visiting a prisoner and that an officer logs the visitor's information onto 
a computer prior to the visit. TT197-9 8. The officer testified that he had pulled a report 
listing visits made to Andrew during his incarceration. TT198. The report did not 
include the names of Robyn, Sydney, or Tristyn Miller. Id; State's Exhibit 26. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant cannot claim plain error in the "purpose to defraud" jury instruction 
where she approved the instructions before they were given to the jury. In any event, the 
instruction was accurate. The instruction properly provided that "a person is guilty of 
forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, [she] makes any writing so that the writing or 
the making purports to be the act of another." Under the circumstances of this case, no 
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instruction was needed to clarify that the "purpose to defraud" could only be an intent 
connected with the act of forgery. 
2. Defendant cannot claim plain error because the trial court did not give a "claim 
of right instruction/' where defendant approved the instructions before they were given. 
In any case, while defendant may have been entitled to a "claim of right" instruction in 
connection with her misdemeanor theft of property conviction, if requested, she was not 
entitled to a "claim of right" instruction in connection with her felony forgery and 
unauthorized use of a financial transaction card convictions. 
3. Defense counsel was not ineffective because he did not seek a more detailed 
"purpose to defraud" jury instruction. The trial court gave a jury instruction that properly 
tracked the statutory law and accurately represented the applicable law. This case 
presented no circumstances requiring a more detailed instruction because it did not 
present potential confusion about the necessary nexus between the intent to defraud and 
the unauthorized writing. 
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not seeking a jury instruction on a "claim 
of right" defense. That defense is not legally available for either forgery or unauthorized 
use of a financial transaction card. While the defense may be available for theft of 
property, defense counsel could have made a reasonable strategic decision not to seek the 
instruction. Such an instruction would have made clear that a "claim or right" defense, 
while applicable to defendant's misdemeanor theft conviction, was inapplicable to 
defendant's felony forgery and unlawful use of a financial transaction card convictions. 
The absence of such an instruction allowed defense counsel to argue the fairness of 
9 
defendant's conduct, whereby she sought unpaid child support, as an informal defense to 
all charges. 
4. Defendant did not preserve her insufficiency claim below and does not make an 
exceptional circumstances or plain error argument on appeal. She has not marshaled the 
evidence supporting the verdict. This Court should therefore decline to address her 




DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM PLAIN ERROR IN THE 
"PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD" JURY INSTRUCTION WHERE SHE 
APPROVED THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN; 
IN ANY CASE, NO ERROR OCCURRED 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that "a 
person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, [she] makes any writing so 
that the writing or the making purports to be the act of another.59 Br. Appellant at 19 
(emphasis and alteration in original). Defendant apparently believes that she could have 
committed forgery when she purported to sign Andrew Miller's signature only if she 
intended to defraud Andrew, not if she intended to defraud the bank. Id. Defendant 
claims that the jury instructions did not adequately explain the intent requirement and that 
"it is reasonable to conclude that the jury may have believed that the bank was the 
victim." Id. at 20. 
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Defendant invited any error in the "purpose to defraud" instruction and therefore is 
not entitled to review of her claim. In any case, no error occurred. 
A. Defendant invited any error in the "purpose to defraud" instruction. 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, directs that "[objections to written 
instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury." Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(e). "Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid manifest injustice." Id. 
Review for manifest injustice is available where "instead of objecting, counsel 
merely remained silent at trial." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111 
(quotation and citation omitted). "However, if counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, [the appellate court] will not review the instruction under the manifest 
injustice exception." Id. Where counsel "confirmfs] on the record" that defendant "takes 
no exception to the instructions," counsel "affirmatively indicates] that [defendant] ha[s] 
no objections to the instructions." Id. at *f 55. In that case, "the manifest injustice 
exception does not apply." Id. 
In this case, in a conference after defendant rested and before the State presented 
rebuttal, the trial court noted that the jury instructions had been completed and confirmed 
that counsel had reviewed them. TT193. The court then asked, "Do you have any 
exceptions . . . on the jury instructions?" Id. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
answered, "No." Id. 
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By his statement, defense counsel affirmatively represented to the court that he 
had no objection to the jury instructions. Thus, defendant is not entitled to review of this 
claim for manifest injustice. 
B. In any case, no error occurred. 
Citing State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995), defendant argues that 
the "purpose to defraud" jury instruction was inadequate. Br. Appellant at 19. She 
claims that the jury instruction should have specified an intent to defraud Andrew, not 
merely an intent to defraud anyone. See id. at 19-20. She argues that the jury may have 
found that she had an intent to defraud the bank, rather than to defraud Andrew, and 
claims that this possibility undermines the conviction. See id. In making this claim, 
defendant misconstrues the holding in Winward. 
The forgery statute provides: "A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud be be perpetrated by 
anyone, he makes . . . any writing so that the writing . . . purports to be the act of 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(l)(b) (2002). 
Jury instruction 10 in this case contains the following language: 
You are instructed that before you may find Defendant. . . guilty of 
the offense of Forgery,. . .the State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and everyone of the 
following elements: 
(1) The defendant acted with the purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that [s]he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetuated by anyone; 
and 
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(2) Without authority did make . . . or utter any writing so that the 
writing or the making,.. . or utterance purports to be the act of 
another... ; and 
(3) That such acts occurred in Iron County, State of Utah, on or 
about February 10, 2002, August 4, 2002, and November 8, 2002. 
R106. 
Since "purpose to defraud" is one of the culpable mental states specified in the 
forgery statute, the jury was instructed in accordance with the applicable statute. Utah's 
appellate courts have held that jury instructions correctly state the applicable law to the 
extent that they track the relevant statutory language. See, e.g., State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 
747, 748 (Utah 1984); State v. Larsen, 87 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Lopez, 789 P.2d 30, 45 (Utah App. 1990). Since Instruction 10 followed the language of 
the forgery statute, it correctly states the law. 
Defendant relies on Winward to support her argument that a correct instruction 
required language that defendant intended to defraud Andrew, not anyone. Br. Appellant 
at 19-20. Winward, however, presented distinctive factual circumstances not present 
here, and its holding is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
Emer Winward, together with his real-estate-agent wife, arranged for ownership of 
a piece of real property to change hands three times in a single day. Winward, 909 P.2d 
at 910-11. In arranging for the transactions, Winward did not fully reveal his financial 
interest in the transactions to the various sellers and buyers. Id. 
The complex series of transactions resulted in a net profit of nearly $5000 to the 
first buyer, Nicole Packer. Id. at 911. The title company through which the transactions 
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were completed issued a check payable to Packer. Unknown to Packer, defendant 
collected the check, forged Packer's name on it, and deposited it in his wife's account. 
Id. At Winward's forgery trial, the prosecution introduced evidence suggesting that 
Winward intended to defraud numerous parties, including Nicole Packer, the original 
sellers, the final buyers, the realty company through which the property was listed, and 
Mrs. Winward's credit union. Id. at 911-12. 
This Court noted that "the State need not prove exactly who the defendant 
intended to defraud, provided the State can prove that the defendant acted with the 
requisite intent to defraud." Id. at 912. However, the Court held that since "the only 
person that defendant could possibly have intended to defraud by engaging in this 
conduct [i.e., the forgery] was Nicole Packer," the trial court erred in admitting evidence 
suggesting that Winward had committed wrongful acts against the other entities. Id. at 
913. The Court further held that the trial court's error in admitting the extraneous 
evidence was "compounded by the court's refusal to instruct the jurors tha t . . . they must 
find that when he signed Packer's name to the check, Winward possessed the specific 
intent to defraud Packer." Id. at 913-14. 
This Court reasoned that, as a result, "the jury lacked the proper framework within 
which it could meaningfully evaluate the necessary elements of the crime charged." Id. 
But the Court qualified its holding: "[I]f the evidence was well-focused, making clear 
that if defendant intended to defraud anyone by his unauthorized endorsement it would 
have to have been Packer, the jury instructions could have been less precise." Id. at 914. 
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Phrased differently, the problem in Winward was that the evidence supported a 
finding that Winward may have had an intent to defraud a number of individuals when he 
arranged for the several sales and purchases of the property without revealing his interest 
as a party to the transactions. The intent to defraud those individuals, however, did not 
have a sufficient connection with the forgery. Only Winward's intent to defraud Packer, 
by forging her signature and depositing the check made out to her, was sufficiently 
connected to the forgery to provide the requisite intent to defraud. 
The Court stated: "[T]o sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a sufficient 
connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud." 909 P.2d at 912. '"[I]n 
order to subject a person to criminal liability for a felony or serious misdemeanor, there 
must be a concurrence of an unlawful act (actus rea) and a culpable mental state (mens 
rea).'" Id. (quoting Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982) (en banc)) 
(emphasis in Winward). 
The Court continued, "Moreover, even if a defendant possesses both an intent to 
defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery 
conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done in furtherance of the intention." 
Id. at 913. In other words, "a defendant who has signed another's name without 
permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the 
unauthorized endorsement, has not committed forgery." Id. 
In Winward, evidence of defendant's deceptions of a number of persons presented 
the possibility that the jury may have found an intent to defraud in connection with some 
uncharged offense or wrong, rather than in connection with the charged offense. That 
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possibility is not present in this case. If the jury found that defendant acted with the 
intent to defraud, that intent could only have been connected with her act of signing 
Andrew's name to the bankcard applications. Thus, the instruction, which tracked the 
language of the statute, sufficed. There was no need for the instruction to specify an 
intent to defraud Andrew. 
Defendant argues that the jury may have found that she intended to defraud the 
bank rather than Andrew. Br. Appellant at 20. The evidence showed that the bank 
reimbursed Andrew for some of his losses. TT63-95. The fact that the bank was also a 
potential victim of the fraudulent act did not, however, create the problem addressed in 
Winward. Had the jury believed that defendant had the intent to defraud the bank, that 
intent, like an intent to defraud Andrew, was connected to the false writing. Whether 
defendant intended to defraud Andrew or the bank or both, that intent had a clear nexus 
with the unauthorized signing of Andrew's name. Thus, there was a "concurrence of an 
unlawful act (actus rea) and a culpable mental state (mens rea)." Winward, 909 P.2d at 
912 (quoting Hendershott, 653 P.2d at 390) (emphasis in Winward). 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S 
UNPRESERVED CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
NOT GIVING A "CLAIM OF RIGHT" INSTRUCTION WHERE 
DEFENDANT APPROVED THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THEY 
WERE GIVEN; IN ANY CASE, NO ERROR OCCURRED WITH 
RESPECT TO HER FELONY CONVICTIONS 
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in not including any instruction or 
definition addressing [her] right or entitlement to the proceeds obtained" as a result of the 
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offense. Br. Appellant at 22. This claim is unpreserved. If error occurred, defendant 
invited it. In any case, no error occurred with respect to defendant's felony convictions. 
A. Defendant invited the alleged error. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not give "a more definitive 
instruction . . . concerning [her] entitlement or right to proceeds in the victim's account." 
Id. Defendant did not preserve this claim below. On appeal, defendant does not argue 
that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justifies review of the issue. This Court 
should therefore decline to review the claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Moreover, even if defendant had argued "manifest injustice" or "plain error," she 
would not have been entitled to review. As explained under Point IA, above, defendant 
approved the instructions before they were given. She thus affirmatively represented that 
the instructions were accurate, inviting the error she now claims on appeal. Thus, she is 
not entitled to review of this claim for manifest injustice or plain error. See Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, at \ 54. 
B. In any case, no error occurred with respect to her felony convictions. 
Defendant claimed below that Andrew owed her child support and that the money 
taken from his account was money to which she was entitled. TT48, 178, 220-21. 
Defendant now asserts that the trial court should have given a jury instruction regarding 
her "claim of right" to the proceeds taken from Andrew's accounts. Br. Appellant at 22-
23. While defendant may possibly have been entitled to a "claim of right" defense with 
respect to her misdemeanor theft conviction, she was not entitled to that defense with 
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respect to the felony forgery and felony unlawful use of a financial transaction card 
convictions. 
The controlling case on this point is State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 64 P.3d 
1218. In Hobbs, this Court rejected a robbery defendant's claim that the trial court erred 
when it refused to give the jury a claim of right instruction. Id. at f 24. Observing that 
the criminal code governs all defenses, the Court held that a claim of right defense was 
not available for robbery because it was not specifically designated in the criminal code. 
See id., at ffif 15, 22, 24; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103.3 
Defendant cites no statutory support for her "claim of right" defense. The State 
has located only one statute in the criminal code that addresses a "claim of right" defense. 
Chapter six of title 76 addresses offenses against property. Section 402 of part four 
provides: "It is a defense under this part" that the actor had "an honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or service as he did." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(b). 
When the legislature promulgated the criminal code in 1973, it abolished all 
common law crimes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (2003); see also State v. Tuttle, 730 
P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1986). As part of this process, the legislature also abolished all 
common law defenses. See 1973 Utah Laws 585, ch. 196, § 76-1-103 (proving "[t]he 
provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses 
against any offense defined in this code") (emphasis added); see also Tuttle, 730 P.2d at 
632 ("In an effort to rationalize, clarify, and improve upon the frequently archaic 
common law definitions of crimes, the legislature in 1973 repealed wholesale all the prior 
substantive criminal statutes (including, necessarily, defenses) and enacted a sweeping 
new penal code that departed sharply from the old common law concepts."). Thus, the 
only defenses now available are those set forth by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 
("The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and 
defenses against any offense defined in this code . . . . " ) . 
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Part four addresses theft. Thus, in some circumstances, a defendant may have a 
"claim of right" defense to a charge of theft. But the "claim of right" defense is available 
only with respect to those offenses set forth in part four of chapter six, that is, theft 
offenses. Forgery and unlawful use of a financial transaction card are not crimes set forth 
in part four.4 
The trial court therefore had no duty to give an instruction regarding a claim of 
right defense with respect to forgery and unlawful use of a financial transaction card. 
Further, although the defense may sometimes be available for theft and although the trial 
court may possibly have committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on a "claim 
of right" defense to the theft count, defendant made no "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances" argument to justify review on appeal and this Court should therefore 
decline to address her claim. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. Moreover, as explained 
under Point IIA, above, defendant is not entitled to review of her unpreserved claim 
where she invited the alleged error. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, at f^ 54. 
4
 Moreover, "[wjhere the legislature was obviously aware of the availability of the 
claim of right defense, having included it within the definition of theft," it can reasonably 
be "assume[d] [that] the legislature would have included it within [the forgery and 
unlawful use of a financial transaction card] statute[s] had the legislature intended to do 
so." Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, at 1f 22. 
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III. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
SEEKING A MORE DETAILED "PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD" JURY 
INSTRUCTION OR FOR NOT REQUESTING A "CLAIM OF 
RIGHT" DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 
Defendant claims that trial counsel should have "propose[d] a more detailed 
instruction qualifying forgery and theft" and should have "take[n] exception to the 
instructions given by the court." Br. Appellant at 23. Because counsel did not, defendant 
now claims that counsel's assistance was ineffective. Id Defendant does not make clear 
whether she believes counsel was ineffective with respect to the "purpose to defraud" 
instruction or with respect to a possible "claim of right" instruction or both. Counsel's 
performance, however, was effective. 
"Establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires [defendant] to meet the 
heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance which fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced [her]." State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, \ 5, 37 P.3d 1099 
(quotation and citation omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984). Defendant must "identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside the wide 
range of professional assistance and illustrate that, absent those acts or omissions, there is 
a reasonable probability of a more favorable result." State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20, 
984 P.2d 376 (quotation and citation omitted). Failure "to make motions or objects 
which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. 
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotation and citation omitted). 
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Further, in determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant 
"must overcome the strong presumption that [her] trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162 (quotation and citation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). "Thus, if the challenged act or omission might be 
considered sound trial strategy, [the court] will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy 
of counsel." State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, % 10, 4 P.3d 778 (quotation and citation 
omitted). A failure to object does not constitute deficient performance where "counsel 
may have reasonably believed that any objection would have placed undue and 
unfavorable emphasis on some point or where counsel may have "made a deliberate and 
tactical choice in not focusing the jury's attention on a matter." Id. at \ 11. 
A. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not seeking a more detailed "purpose to 
defraud" jury instruction or for not requesting a "claim of right" defense 
instruction with respect to the forgery and unlawful use of a financial 
transaction card counts. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not ask the trial 
court to instruct the jury that the "purpose to defraud" required intent to defraud Andrew 
rather than intent to defraud anyone. See Br. Appellant at 23-24. Counsel's performance 
was not deficient, and defendant suffered no prejudice. 
As explained in Point IB, above, the trial court gave an appropriate "purpose to 
defraud" jury instruction. The instruction given, which tracked the statutory language 
was adequate, and the trial court had no duty to give a different instruction. Moreover, 
this case, unlike Winward, presented no possibility that the jury might have found an 
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"intent to defraud" related to some uncharged offense, but not related to the forgery. 
There was therefore no need for a more detailed instruction to clarify that the "intent to 
defraud" had to have some concurrence with the making of a writing purporting to be the 
act of someone else. Thus, defendant was not entitled to such an instruction. 
Counsel's failure to request an instruction to which defendant has no entitlement is 
not deficient performance. Not making motions and requests "which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute deficient performance." Whittle, 1999 UT 96, at % 34 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced because counsel did not request a more 
detailed instruction. Defendant suffered no prejudice as "there is no reasonable 
probability" that giving the jury a more detailed instruction would have resulted in "a 
more favorable outcome." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, at f 20. The only evidence of intent to 
defraud presented to the jury was evidence of defendant's intent to defraud when she 
made and submitted the forged bankcard applications. Therefore, when the jury found 
intent to defraud, they necessarily found intent to defraud in connection with the making 
and uttering of the forged bankcard applications. Thus, they would have found intent 
even if a more detailed instruction had been given. 
B. Trial counsel was not ineffective because he did not request a "claim of right" 
defense instruction with respect to the theft count 
A decision not to request a "claim of right" defense instruction in this case could 
be considered reasonable trial strategy. Not seeking such an instruction is therefore not 
deficient performance. As explained in Point IIB, above, defendant may have been 
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entitled to assert a "claim of right" defense, but only with respect to the theft count. 
Because the "claim of right" defense was available only for the misdemeanor theft count, 
counsel may have made a tactical decision not to ask for a "claim of right" jury 
instruction. Had he requested that instruction, the prosecution could have asked for 
language clarifying that the defense was available for the misdemeanor theft charge, but 
not for the felony forgery charges and not for the felony unlawful use of a financial card 
charge. 
That clarification would have undermined an argument defense counsel implicitly 
presented to the jury, an argument suggesting the unfairness of finding defendant guilty 
where she was only attempting to collect unpaid child support. See TT48 (defense 
counsel's opening statement) ("[I]t's the defense position that the authorization did occur, 
that she did nothing wrong under the law . . . in that she responded to a critical situation 
when he was unavailable and unable to complete the duties that he had as a parent."), 178 
(defendant's testimony) ("He's never been current [with child support payments)."), 221 
(defendant's closing argument) ("He's still not current in child support."), 223 
(defendant's closing argument) ("I don't believe that, for one second, [defendant] 
intentionally took something which she wasn't authorized to take. She was told in a court 
order that she could have it. She was told, and her daughter was told by defendant, that 
she could have it."), 224 (prosecutor's closing argument rebuttal) ("This case is not about 
child support."). 
Thus, seeking a "claim of right" jury instruction might have actually undermined 
defense counsel's appeal to the jury's sense of fairness. Because a request for the 
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instruction may also have elicited explicit direction that a "claim of right" defense is not 
available for forgery or unlawful use of a financial transaction card, defendant may have 
made a strategic decision not to seek the instruction. Under the circumstances of this 
case, where defendant's exposure on felony charges exceeded her exposure on the 
misdemeanor theft charge, not seeking a "claim of right" jury instruction could be 
considered sound trial strategy. There was a "conceivable tactical basis" for counsel's 
not seeking the instruction. Clark, 2004 UT 25, at f 6. Defendant therefore cannot 
demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently when he did not seek the instruction. 
IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS 
Defendant claims that the evidence does not suffice to support the forgery and 
theft of property convictions.5 Br. Appellant at 15. Defendant did not preserve this claim 
below and does not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error to justify review on 
appeal. She does not adequately marshal the record evidence that supports the 
convictions. This Court should therefore decline to address defendant's claim. In any 
event, the evidence does support the convictions. 
5
 Defendant does not make an insufficiency claim with respect to the unlawful use 
of a financial transaction card conviction. See Br. Appellant at 15. 
24 
A. This Court should decline to review defendant's unpreserved insufficiency 
claim where defendant does not make an exceptional circumstances or plain 
error argument to justify review on appeal and does not adequately marshal 
the evidence supporting the convictions. 
1. Failure to preserve. 
Defendant did not preserve her insufficiency claim below. On appeal, she does 
not argue that exceptional circumstances or plain error justify review of her unpreserved 
claim. See Br. Appellant at 15-19. Because defendant has not made an exceptional 
circumstances or plain error argument to justify review of her unpreserved claim, this 
Court should decline to review it. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
2. Failure to marshal. 
Moreover, while defendant does mention some evidence favorable to the verdict in 
the facts section of her brief, she does not adequately marshal the evidence. "To comply 
with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at 
the point at which they challenge the factual finding," that is, in the argument section at 
the point addressing the issue. See Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, |^ 47 n. 11, 54 P.3d 
1119 (emphasis in original) (citing Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah 
App. 1987) for the proposition that an "appellant's listing of favorable facts in facts 
section [does] not meet marshaling requirement"). Defendant "must present every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports" the verdict, and, "[a]fter 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,... ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.22d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991). 
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Defendant has not done so. In her argument regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence, defendant has done little or nothing to marshal the evidence supporting the 
verdict. See Br. Appellant at 15-19. Because defendant has not adequately marshaled the 
evidence, this Court should decline to review her claim. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT 
App 355, \ 6, 36 P.3d 533 (declining to review defendant's challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence where defendant failed to meet his marshaling burden). 
B. In any case, the evidence sufficed to support the convictions. 
Defendant claims that the evidence does not suffice to support the forgery and 
theft of property convictions. See Br. Appellant at 15. Defendant's argument is not, 
reduced to its essence, an insufficiency claim, but a claim that defendant was entitled to a 
"claim of right" defense. See Br. Appellant at 15-18. The State has addressed that issue 
under Point IIB, above. 
In any case, the evidence did suffice to support the convictions. To demonstrate 
forgery, the State must present evidence that, without authorization and having a purpose 
to defraud anyone, a defendant made, published, or uttered a writing purporting to be the 
act of another. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. Here, evidence was presented to show 
that defendant signed Andrew's name to three different debit card applications, that the 
signings were without authorization, and that defendant acted with an intent to take funds 
from Andrew's account without his permission. TT58-62, 188. Defendant conceded that 
she signed the debit card applications. TT188. Andrew gave testimony that he did not 
authorize defendant's acts. TT58-62. Her intent to take the funds can be inferred from 
her conduct, that is, from evidence that she actually did take the funds. See State v. 
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Smith, 2003 UT App 179,116, 72 P.3d 692 (stating that a defendant's "intent 'may be 
inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding circumstances'") (quoting 
State v. ColwelU 2000 UT 8, f 43, 994 P.2d 177). 
To demonstrate theft of property, the State must present evidence that that the 
defendant "obtained] or exercise[d] unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. The State 
presented evidence that defendant withdrew sums of money from Andrew's account and 
that Andrew did not authorize the withdrawals. See TT62-63, 91, 94-95, 103; State's 
Exhibits 8-12. Defendant's "purpose to deprive" Andrew of those funds can be inferred 
from defendant's acts. See Smith, 2003 UT App 179, at 143 (stating that intent can be 
inferred from conduct). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. If the Court finds that defense 
counsel was ineffective for not seeking a "claim of right" defense instruction with respect 
to the misdemeanor theft charge, this Court should nevertheless affirm the felony 
convictions. 
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ADDENDUM 
76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior to effective date. 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment 
for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense 
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the effective 
date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be 
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment available 
under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried after the 
effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed to have 
been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the elements of the 
offense occurred prior thereto. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 01004.ZIP 1,974 Bytes 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the property 
or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled 
to infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall 
not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly 
believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 07024.ZIP 2,118 Bytes 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07026.ZIP 1,608 Bytes 
76-6-501. Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
uttefs any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and 
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a 
government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
Amended by Chapter 205,1996 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 07045 .^I£ 2,429 Bytes 
76-6-506.2. Financial transaction card offenses — Unlawful use of card or 
automated banking device — False application for card. 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or 
purchase or attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, by the use of a false, 
fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or fraudulently obtained 
financial transaction card, by any financial transaction card credit number, 
personal identification code, or by the use of a financial transaction card not 
authorized by the issuer or the card holder; 
(2) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to knowingly and 
willfully exceed the actual balance of a demand or time deposit account; 
(3) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed 
an authorized credit line by $500 or more, or by 50% of such line, whichever is 
greater; 
(4) willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into his or any other account by 
means of an automated banking device a false, fictitious, forged, altered, or 
counterfeit check, draft, money order, or any other similar document; 
(5) make application for a financial transaction card to an issuer, while 
knowingly making or causing to be made a false statement or report relative to his 
name, occupation, financial condition, assets, or to willfully and substantially 
undervalue or understate any indebtedness for the purposes of influencing the 
issuer to issue the financial transaction card; or 
(6) knowingly, with intent to defraud any authorized credit card merchant, card 
holder, or issuer, sell or attempt to sell credit card sales drafts to an authorized 
credit card merchant or any other person or organization, for any consideration 
whether at a discount or otherwise, or present or cause to be presented to the issuer 
or an authorized credit card merchant, for payment or collection, any such credit 
card sales draft, if: 
(i) the draft is counterfeit or fictitious; 
(ii) the purported sales evidenced by any such credit card sales draft did not 
take place; 
(iii) the purported sale was not authorized by the card holder; 
(iv) the items or services purported to be sold as evidenced by the credit card 
sales drafts are not delivered or rendered to the card holder or person intended to 
receive them; or 
(v) when delivered or rendered, the goods or services are materially different or 
of materially lesser value or quality than represented by the seller or his agent to 
the purchaser, or have substantial discrepancies from goods or services impliedly 
represented by the purchase price when compared with the actual goods or 
services delivered or rendered. 
Amended by Chapter 60, 1991 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 07052.ZIP 2,878 Bytes 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct 
the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the 
elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms. 
The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties 
and agreed to by the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will 
assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in 
writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final pretrial conference or at 
such other time as the court directs, a party may file a written request that the court 
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. The court shall inform the 
parties of its action upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it 
shall furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
waive this requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law if the 
instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the 
written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the 
content of the instruction. A party may request an interim written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law 
as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be 
furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final instructions shall be 
in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court shall provide a 
copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion, provide a copy to all 
jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall 
endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the 
court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge was 
given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are 
given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given 
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall 
provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a 
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction 
may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the 
objection the party shall identify the matter to which the objection is made and the 
ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers 
to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges 
of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the 
jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
